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RUSSIAN PROTECTIONISM AND THE 
STRATEGIC SECTORS LAW 
BY WILLIAM E. POMERANZ* 
A perennial cloud seems to hang over the topic of Russia and 
international trade. Therefore, as Russia contemplates tough 
economic times ahead, and the growing risk of protectionism, I want 
to begin on an overall upbeat note.  For all of the obstacles to foreign 
investment in Russia—and they are considerable and will be 
discussed below—Russia nevertheless has stood out as a relatively 
good destination for foreign goods and services for most of the past 
decade. Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) jumped from $2.4 billion 
in 2001 to $36.1 billion in 2007.1 Similarly, the value of Russian 
imports increased from $53.8 billion in 2001 to $225.3 billion in 
2007.2 Critics may argue that the FDI numbers could have been even 
better if Russia addressed certain fundamental structural deficiencies 
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Judgments under Russian Law, 34 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 15 (2009). 
 1. U.S.–Russia Business Council, Russian Economic Indicators, 
https://www.usrbc.org/resources/Russianeconomicindicators (last visited Nov. 29, 
2009). 
 2. Id. 
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(corruption, unclear laws, lack of infrastructure, etc.). Nevertheless, 
the above statistics testify to the growing attractiveness of the 
Russian market just prior to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Another piece of relatively good news is that, at least rhetorically, 
Russia did not call for protectionism in the immediate aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crash.3 In January 2009 at the Davos summit, 
Prime Minister Putin struck most of the right notes: “The leaders of 
the world’s largest economies agreed during the November 2008 
G20 summit not to create barriers hindering global trade and capital 
flows. Russia shares these principles.”4 Putin proceeded to reject 
financial populism and excessive state interventionism as possible 
solutions to Russia’s economic woes, adding that Russia should not 
repeat the mistaken policies of the Soviet Union.5 
Yet despite voicing the right sentiments, Russia nevertheless 
remains vulnerable to reneging on its foreign trade commitments and 
moving toward protectionism. In August 2008, for example, Prime 
Minister Putin first suggested that Russia was considering going 
back on some of its World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
commitments, most notably in the area of agriculture.6 This 
statement carried major economic consequences, since agricultural 
subsidies have been a major stumbling block in Russia’s seemingly 
 
 3. See Stephen Sestanovich, Russia and the Global Economic Crisis, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17844/ 
(contrasting Russia’s protectionist response to the 1998 economic crisis with the 
current leadership’s emphasis on greater participation in the global economy). 
 4. Vladimir Putin, Russ. Prime Minister, Speech at the Opening Ceremony of 
the World Economic Forum (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.weforum.org/ 
pdf/AM_2009/OpeningAddress_VladimirPutin.pdf. 
 5. See id. (arguing that the Soviet Union’s policy of complete economic 
intervention made its economy “totally uncompetitive”). 
 6. See Anna Smolchenko, Putin Eyes Retreat on WTO Accords, MOSCOW 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008 (reporting that Putin has publicly stated that Russia will not 
sacrifice its own economic interests in favor of expedited WTO accession); see 
also David Tarr, Russian WTO Accession: What Has Been Accomplished, What 
Can Be Expected 8-9 (World Bank Dev. Res. Group Trade Team, Policy Res. 
Working Paper No. 4428, 2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ 
external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/12/04/000158349_200712041
05142/Rendered/PDF/wps4428.pdf (offering a brief history of Russia’s WTO 
accession process and asserting that agricultural subsidies remain a particular point 
of contention). 
POMERANZ_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:30 PM 
2010] RUSSIAN PROTECTIONISM 215 
eternal (sixteen years and counting) quest to join the WTO.7 Putin’s 
statement, in turn, most likely was provoked by the comments of 
then-U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, who suggested 
that Russia’s WTO accession was at risk in light of the August 2008 
Russia-Georgia crisis.8 
As the above exchange suggests, international trade remains a 
highly politicized issue for Russia, subject to the whims of external 
events. Moreover, despite the overall encouraging trends and 
statistics, Russia has not been hesitant to resort to both tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to defend domestic industries. In 2008, for 
example, Russia imposed tariffs to limit the import of foreign cars in 
an attempt to protect the country’s flagging automobile sector, as 
well as export tariffs on timber to promote the domestic timber 
industry.9 As for non-tariff barriers, Russian inspectors are notorious 
for restricting U.S. poultry imports based on various existing (and 
non-existing) health and safety grounds.10 Major international energy 
projects also have stalled while Russian authorities investigated 
highly technical violations of Russia’s environmental laws.11  
 
 7. See Mike Moore, Director-General, WTO, Speech at High Level Round 
Table on “Russia, the International Economy and the World Trade Organization” 
(Mar. 30, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm 
56_e.htm (acknowledging positive Russian efforts to modernize its legislation and 
enforcement structure for agricultural subsidies but noting that Russia is currently 
not in compliance with WTO requirements for membership). See generally 
Bogdan Lissovolik & Yaroslav Lissovolik, Russia and the WTO: The “Gravity” of 
Outsider Status 39 (IMF Working Paper WP/04/159, 2004), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04159.pdf (presenting a timeline 
of Russian WTO accession, from Russia’s initial request for accession in 1993 up 
to the status of negotiations in 2004). 
 8. See Smolchenko, supra note 6 (indicating that Russia’s First Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Shuvalov believed Gutierrez was contradicting his earlier vow to 
support Russia’s WTO accession). 
 9. See Nikolaus von Twickel, Trade Spats, Visas to Top EU Talks, MOSCOW 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009 (reporting that Russian protectionist trade practices in certain 
sectors, including the automotive and timber industries, have jeopardized WTO 
negotiations and trade talks with the E.U.). 
 10. See, e.g., Restrictions on Imports to Aid Poultry Plants, MOSCOW TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2009 (suggesting that efforts to restrict the importation of U.S. poultry 
due to purported traces of antibiotics may positively affect Russia’s domestic 
poultry industry). 
 11. See Andrew Kramer, A Mix of Oil and Environmentalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
6, 2006, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/business/world 
business/06sakhalin.html?scp=1&sq=Kramer&st=nyt (reporting that industry 
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Thus, Russia’s actual record often fails to follow its rhetoric on 
international trade. In particular, the passage of the Law on Foreign 
Investment in Strategic Sectors (“Strategic Sectors Law”) in 2008 
raised the specter of increased Russian protectionism.12 This law 
represented one of Putin’s last official acts as president and came 
into force on May 7, 2008, literally the day that President Medvedev 
took the oath of office.13 The Strategic Sectors Law establishes 
certain procedures for foreign investors—and groups that include a 
foreign investor—that possess an equity interest in a business “of 
strategic importance for national defense and state security, and (or) 
consummate transactions to gain majority interest in the equity” of 
such entities.14 The law covers an expansive list of so-designated 
“key” industries, including: aviation, mining, encryption, nuclear 
development, space, arms production, telecommunications, fishing, 
certain types of publishing activities, and television and radio 
broadcast media covering half the country.15 In total, the Strategic 
Sectors Law recognizes forty-two types of activities as being of 
strategic importance to national defense and state security.16 
It must be emphasized that foreign companies are not necessarily 
prohibited under this statute from purchasing an equity interest in 
these strategic companies; however, they first must undergo a 
national security review set forth in the Strategic Sectors Law before 
 
analysts believe Russia’s selective enforcement of environmental policies is 
designed to force the renegotiation of pricey energy contracts made in the 1990s). 
 12. Federal’nyi zakon ot 29 aprelia 2008 goda N 57-FZ  “O poriadke 
osyshchestvleniia inostrannykh investitsii v khoziaistvennye obshchestva, 
imeiushchie strategicheskoe znachenie dlia obespecheniia oborony strany i 
bezopasnosti gosudarstva,” ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] [Russian newspaper]   
May 7, 2008, art. 2 [hereinafter Strategic Sectors Law], available at 
http://www.rg.ru/2008/05/07/investicii-fz-dok.html (English translation available 
at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/legislation/20300.shtml); see also Toby Gati, 
Russia’s New Law on Foreign Investment in Strategic Sectors and the Role of State 
Corporations in the Russian Economy 12-13, 21 (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.akin 
gump.com/files/upload/Foreign_Investment%20in%20Russian%20Strategic%20S
ectors%20-%20by%20Toby%20T.%20Gati.pdf (asserting that the Strategic 
Sectors Law is reflective of Russia’s “general wariness towards foreign 
investment”). 
 13. Strategic Sectors Law, supra note 12. 
 14. Id. art. 1. 
 15. Id. art. 6. 
 16. Id. 
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consummating such a transaction.17 To summarize, the following 
purchase thresholds and related requirements trigger a mandatory 
review. Foreign companies are required to undergo a security review 
of the transaction where they are seeking: (1) to purchase a 
“controlling interest” (usually more than fifty percent) in a business 
operating in a strategic industry; (2) the right to select the single 
executive body of a company and/or at least half of the members of a 
collegial executive body; or (3) to otherwise transfer the rights to 
control the company’s decisions.18 For certain industries owning 
rights to natural resources (i.e., companies holding so-designated 
“subsoil plots of federal significance”), a ten percent equity purchase 
triggers a review.19 In addition, for a foreign government-controlled 
entity, approval is required if the proposed transaction will result in 
the right to manage, either directly or indirectly, twenty-five percent 
of the strategic company.20 
If a foreign transaction meets one of the above criteria, or any 
other acquisition condition articulated under the Strategic Sectors 
Law, then a foreign investor must follow the application process set 
forth in the statute to obtain final approval of the transaction.21 
Numerous materials are required for this process, including the 
founding documents of the petitioner, a description of the petitioner’s 
main activities over the past two years, and a draft business plan.22  
All these materials are ultimately collected by the Federal Anti-
Monopoly Service and reviewed by the Commission for Foreign 
 
 17. Id. arts. 1, 7. 
 18. Id. arts. 7.1.1(a)-(b), 7.1.6. 
 19. Id. art. 7.1.2; see also Baker & McKenzie, Russia Enacts New Law on 
Foreign Investments in Strategic Areas (June 2008), http://www.bakernet.com/ 
BakerNet/Locations/Europe+Middle+East/Offices/Russia/Press+Releases/RussiaF
oreignInvestmentsJun08.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (acknowledging that 
additional ownership restrictions are placed on companies developing natural 
resource deposits on the Russian continental shelf). 
 20. Strategic Sectors Law, supra note 12, art. 7.1.5 (reducing the requisite 
percentage to five percent where the foreign government-controlled entity seeks 
direct or indirect control of the strategic company through ownership of voting 
shares). 
 21. Id. art. 8. 
 22. Id. art. 8.2.1 – 8.2.11. The Strategic Sectors Law also provides that when 
entities are unsure if their ownership or control levels trigger the national security 
review, they may send an enquiry to “the authorized body” in order to determine 
whether a review is required. Id. art. 8.6. 
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Investment Control (“Commission”), headed by the Russian prime 
minister. Thus, it may be more than coincidence that Putin signed the 
Strategic Sectors Law in April 2008 as president and then, a few 
months later, found himself in charge of the law’s chief decision-
making body.23 In theory, the entire review process should take no 
longer than three months from the time that a petition is registered, 
although in certain “exceptional” circumstances, this time period 
may be extended an additional three months.24 Failure to follow the 
designated approval process will result in the nullification of any 
acquisition.25  
Russia, of course, is by no means the only country that takes into 
account national security considerations when reviewing foreign 
investments. The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) regularly reviews 
foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that may have national 
security implications.26 CFIUS successfully maintained a low-profile 
until its controversial approval in 2006 of an acquisition by Dubai 
Ports World (a United Arab Emirates company) of several major 
U.S. seaports.27 The uproar surrounding this proposed transaction, 
and the potential national security ramifications of a Middle East 
company operating major port facilities in the United States, 
ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of Dubai Ports World’s offer. 
Moreover, in the aftermath of this controversy, Congress introduced 
several changes to the CFIUS process under the Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”). Pursuant to FINSA, 
the director of national intelligence now serves as a non-voting, ex 
officio  member  of  CFIUS.28  The scope of national security reviews 
 
 23. See Christopher Kenneth, Putin to Play a Decisive Role in the Strategic 
Sectors Law Enforcement, RUSS. CORP. WORLD, Nov. 2008, at 11-12, available at 
http://www.trcw.ru/en/articles/detail.php?ID=398 (suggesting “that Putin will have 
the final say in deciding the candidacies of the strategic foreign investors deemed 
eligible to invest” not only per the requirements of the Strategic Sectors Law, but 
also in connection with what Russia deems to be of importance to its national 
security when it applies the law). 
 24. Strategic Sectors Law, supra note 12, art. 11.4. 
 25. Id. art. 15.1. 
 26. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.101, 800.203 (2008). 
 27. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, You Can’t Be CFIUS, WALL ST. J., Jul. 13, 2006, 
at A8 (suggesting the issuance of an executive order increasing CFIUS’ 
transparency and cooperation with Congress). 
 28. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(4)(D) (2007) (restricting the Director’s ability to 
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has also expanded to cover transactions affecting critical 
infrastructure, including energy transactions.29  
As the U.S. experience demonstrates, Russia clearly is not unique 
in weighing the national security implications associated with foreign 
investment. The first informal reports regarding the Strategic Sectors 
Law’s implementation remain rather inconclusive. The Russian 
newspaper Vedomosti reported that, as of February 5, 2009 the 
Federal Anti-Monopoly Service had received forty-five applications, 
of which two had been approved.30 The applications covered such 
industries as space equipment building, natural resources, and 
transport, although no detailed information was provided. 
What cannot be quantified, of course, is how many deals have 
been put on hold—or abandoned—as a result of this legislation. Not 
surprisingly, the overall reaction among foreign investors to the 
implementation of the Strategic Sectors Law has been mixed. On the 
positive side, the law clarified what had been a very muddled picture 
as to how the Russian government would proceed with transactions 
in the so-designated strategic sector. Defined procedures now exist 
that, at least in theory, should make the process more straight-
forward. The problem, of course, is that Russia has established an 
expensive, time consuming, document intensive, and still less-than-
transparent process that may end up discouraging, rather than 
promoting, foreign investment.31 Moreover, a huge uproar among 
 
make policy decisions except with respect to whether a transaction constitutes a 
national security threat). 
 29. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f)(6) (2007); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.203 
(defining “critical infrastructure” as “a system or asset, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of the particular 
system or asset . . . would have a debilitating impact on national security”). 
 30. See Dmitry Kaz’min, Zakryt lazeiki, VEDOMOSTI, Feb. 5, 2009 (indicating 
that the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service plans to limit the ability of other 
governmental agencies to submit comments in order to streamline the petitioning 
process); see also Laura M. Brank & Daria Litvinova, The Impact of the Strategic 
Sectors Law: Six Months In, AMCHAM NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 23, 24, available 
at http://www.amchamnews.ru/issue85/impact_law (asserting that the two 
transactions approved by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service provided little insight 
into the way the commission will actually apply the Strategic Sectors Law). 
 31. See Dmitry Dmitriev & Anna Bogacheva, The Strategic Sectors Law – The 
First Year of Enforcement, RUSS. BUS. WATCH, 2009, available at 
https://www.usrbc.org/pics/Image/RBW/Spring2009/PDF/Legal1.pdf (suspecting 
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foreign investors would undoubtedly ensue if the Russian 
government began to actively use the Strategic Sectors Law to reject 
foreign investment.  
Of course, at the top of this regulatory pyramid now sits Prime 
Minister Putin in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission for 
Foreign Investment Control. How he chooses to exercise his new 
powers overseeing foreign investment in the national defense and 
strategic sectors—and how western businesses respond to his 
ultimate oversight—remains one of the great unknown variables in 
the implementation of this law. Putin did announce on February 5, 
2009 his desire to close certain loopholes in the Strategic Sectors 
Law.32 Putin specifically expressed his concern that “gaps” in the law 
allow “some of our economic entities to circumvent the law’s 
provisions and evade clearance for deals with strategic assets.”33 At 
the same time, the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service discussed 
possible changes to the law, most notably an amendment increasing 
the Commission’s authority to request supplemental materials from 
applicants.34  
But, in addition to closing these loopholes, Putin also discussed 
the possibility of simplifying the application procedures for “good 
faith” investors, as well as the need to reach out to foreign 
investors.35 Putin noted the challenges ahead in terms of attracting 
foreign investment to Russia: “A rather intense rivalry for investment 
resources will unfold in the period of post-crisis development and 
recovery. . . . And our task is to work actively on creating the most 




that potential foreign investors have underestimated the difficulty of meeting the 
Strategic Sectors Law’s informational and timing requirements). 
 32. Anatoly Medestsky, Putin Wants Loopholes Closed, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 
5, 2009. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Kaz’min, supra note 30 (discussing also amendments to the Strategic 
Sectors Law that would close loopholes that allow subsidiaries of foreign 
companies to bypass the law). 
 35. See Medetsky, supra note 32 (recognizing that simplified procedures are 
one method of attracting additional foreign investment). 
 36. Id. 
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It remains unclear to what extent foreign companies, including 
foreign companies owned by Russians, are exploiting loopholes in 
the Strategic Sectors Law. Foreign companies theoretically can 
exercise “control” over a strategic asset even without meeting the 
law’s equity threshold or definition of control, for example, via 
secret shareholder agreements. Moreover, offshore transactions 
between two foreign companies where the seller owns or otherwise 
“controls” a Russian strategic asset theoretically now require a 
strategic review under the Strategic Sectors Law as well. Foreign 
companies finding themselves in such a predicament will have to 
weigh several options; they can either avail themselves of the 
existing review procedures, ignore the law and run the risk of getting 
caught, or simply abandon the deal.  
One can only speculate how the 2008 global economic crisis will 
affect the Strategic Sectors Law and any possible resurgence in 
Russian protectionism. Many of Russia’s strategic industries would 
now seemingly welcome international investment, so it would clearly 
be to Russia’s economic disadvantage to discourage foreign 
investment via the strict enforcement of Strategic Sectors Law.37 
Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Shuvalov, also indicated 
in March 2009 that the Russian government would no longer 
immediately oppose the purchase of Russian debt by foreign 
companies in certain strategic sector industries.38 While Shuvalov 
never explicitly referred to the Strategic Sectors Law, his statement 




 37. See Annie Ferris-Rotman, Crisis May Open Doors to West, MOSCOW 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009 (indicating that Russia’s willingness to accept foreign 
investment in the energy sector, as demonstrated by an Indian company’s takeover 
of the “Russia-focused” Imperial Energy company, surprised most investors). 
 38. See Renata Iambaeva et al., Inostrantsev vziali v dolg, KOMMERS., Mar. 20, 
2009, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1140652 
(reporting that the administration views foreign investment as an alternative to a 
government rescue). 
 39. On September 15, 2009 presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich announced 
that Russia intends to adjust its laws to make foreign investment easier in strategic 
sectors.  Kremlin: Russia to Ease Investment Rules,  REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/RussiaInvestment09/idUSTRE58E5U5 
20090915. 
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While Russia—at least in its public statements—appears to 
appreciate the negative economic consequences of protectionism, it 
is only beginning to understand the political ramifications of such a 
policy. Russia’s unparalleled growth from 2001 through 2007 
resulted in an upsurge of imports, most notably, in the automobile 
sector.40 Thus, when the Russian government imposed import tariffs 
on automobiles in 2008 to protect the domestic industry,41 
demonstrations erupted throughout the country. One of the loudest 
protests occurred in Vladivostok in December 2008.42 It turns out 
that the economy of the Russian Far East was highly dependent on 
the import of automobiles from Japan, and numerous local 
businesses were involved in the repair and service of these vehicles. 
As a result, motorists took to the streets in Vladivostok, demanding 
the removal of these tariffs. Some protesters also voiced political 
demands, and the Kremlin ultimately became so concerned that it 
flew Moscow riot police to Vladivostok to quash the 
demonstrations.43  
But while the protests in Vladivostok and other regions clearly 
rattled the Kremlin, they failed to persuade the Russian government 
to change course; used car imports subsequently fell by ninety-five 
percent in the first quarter of 2009 as a result of the new tariffs.44 
 
 40. See Adam Gallagher & Yuri Shumilov, Overview of the Russian 
Restructuring Market: A Time of Change, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (Feb 
2009) (noting that since the 1998 financial crisis, Russia has averaged a seven 
percent annual growth rate); see also Russian Automobile Market Shows Rapid 
Growth, RNCOS, May 28, 2007, http://www.rncos.com/Blog/2007/05/Russian-
Automobile-Market-Shows-Rapid-Growth.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) 
(reporting a sixty-three percent increase in sales of foreign cars in 2006, and 
attributing the growing demand to a swelling middle class and greater disposable 
income among consumers). 
 41. Michael Schwirtz & Clifford J. Levy, As Economy Sinks, Russians Protest, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/ 
01/world/europe/01russia.html?scp=1&sq=MichaelSchwirtzandProtest&st=cse. 
 42. See id. (indicating that officials violently put down the protest). 
 43. See id. (noting that the government’s forceful response was widely 
condemned); see also Vladimir Ryzhkov, Opinion, Putin’s Biggest New Year’s 
Wish, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=27939 (acknowledging 
that the protests in Vladivostok precipitated additional political demands, which 
included demands for Putin’s resignation, the end of media censorship, and the 
reinstatement of the previous presidential term limits). 
 44. See Challenge to New Car Tariffs Rejected, MOSCOW TIMES, May 22, 2009 
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Other protectionist clouds loom on the horizon as well. Most notably, 
Russia’s unexpected decision in June 2009 to resubmit its application 
to the WTO as part of a loosely based “customs union” with 
Kazakhastan and Belarus means that WTO accession, which requires 
Russia to lower tariffs and open major sectors of its economy to 
foreign competition, appears years away.45  
The Strategic Sectors Law represents another variable in judging 
Russia’s overall commitment to open markets. Ironically, it has been 
a Russian company that appears to have become the most entangled 
in the tentacles of the legislation. In June 2009, the Commission for 
Foreign Investment Control put off Basic Element’s (owned by Oleg 
Deripaska) purchase of the Russian oil company RussNeft.46 The 
transaction was delayed primarily because of the buyer’s 
complicated corporate structure involving almost 100 offshore 
companies. Vice-Premier Igor Sechin seemed slightly bemused that 
legislation designed to review foreign investment had instead 
ensnarled a Russian investor.47 But while Sechin was pleased that 
Basic Element had followed the demands of the Strategic Sectors 
Law, he still voiced his preference that the final purchaser be a 
registered Russian company.48  
The prospect of growing protectionism—whether through the 
Strategic Sectors Law, a retreat from WTO commitments, or other 
tariff and non-tariff measures—remains high in Russia, despite all 
statements to the contrary. Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding 
 
(stating that used car imports decreased from 120,300 in the first quarter of 2008 to 
4,929 in the first quarter of 2009); Car Import Tariffs Won’t Be Changed, 
MOSCOW TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009 (reporting that a government committee has 
extended the existing car tariffs until at least May 2010). 
 45. Aleksei Shapovalov et al., VTO Polychila Optovoe Predlozhenie, 
KOMMERS., June 19, 2009, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?Docs 
ID=1189454. 
 46. See Denis Rebrov, “Russneft” dlia russkikh, KOMMERS., June 8, 2009, 
available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1184916 (reporting that 
the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service has not submitted a final decision on Basic 
Element’s application to purchase RussNeft because of incomplete 
documentation). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; see also Elena Mazneva & Alena Chehel, Slozhno pokupaete, 
VEDOMOSTI, June 9, 2009, at B2 (informing that the Director of the Federal Anti-
Monopoly Service echoes Sechin’s concerns about the nationality of final 
purchasers). 
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Russia’s general commitment to open markets represents one of 
(admittedly) several reasons why FDI declined by some forty-five 
percent during the first six months of 2009.49 But as this article 
demonstrates, it is not simply Russia’s economic growth that is 
threatened by a further retreat from free trade. Any additional 
protectionist measures would hold considerable risks for the Russian 
government, testing the country’s already strained relations with its 
international trading partners and potentially creating new tensions in 
Russian domestic politics as well.  
 
 
 49. See Alex Nicholson & Paul Abelsky, Foreign Investment Declines 45% in 
H1, MOSCOW TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009 (attributing the decrease in FDI also to 
unfavorable credit markets and uncertainties in the Russian and global financial 
markets). 
